The Failed Resolution Process and the Transformation of Kurdish Politics

The Failed Resolution Process and the Transformation of Kurdish Politics

Cuma Çiçek argues that both Turkey’s Kurdish conflict and the Kurdish movement itself changed fundamentally after 1999, the year of Abdullah Öcalan’s capture, pro-Kurdish gains in local elections and Turkey’s EU candidacy. The movement shifted from a rural, underground insurgency towards urban, legal and transnational politics, shaped by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and later by the Rojava project in Syria.

Çiçek examines the three main dialogue efforts: the İmralı Process (1999–2004), the Oslo Process (2008–2011) and the Resolution Process (2013–2015). He attributes their failure to clashing goals, with the state focused only on disarmament while the Kurdish side sought recognition of collective rights; to the exclusion of the legal pro-Kurdish party and of third-party mediators; and to the governing party’s narrow, security-driven agenda, hardened by nationalist pressure and fears about Rojava.

After the Resolution Process collapsed, violence returned, elected Kurdish politicians were jailed and Turkey’s democratic standing declined. Çiçek concludes that any future opening will look very different from earlier attempts, a useful lens for reading the peace process that began in 2024.

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