The United Nations' Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict

The United Nations’ Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict

Yahia H. Zoubir and Anthony G. Pazzanita examine why the UN failed to hold the referendum on self-determination it had promised for Western Sahara, its last decolonisation problem in Africa. A peace plan accepted by Morocco and Polisario in 1988 and a UN mission in place since 1991 had not produced a vote. The authors trace the background through the OAU’s earlier efforts, Morocco’s withdrawal from the OAU in 1984 and the 1988 rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco that made the UN plan possible.

Using Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports, congressional testimony and press reports, they identify voter eligibility as the central obstacle. Morocco wanted a broad electorate, while Polisario wanted one based on the 1974 Spanish census. Successive compromises from the Secretary-General led only to extensions of the process. The authors also document Moroccan obstruction of UN staff, alleged mismanagement within MINURSO and US funding cuts.

They conclude that the plan faced serious obstacles, that withdrawing MINURSO could end the only stable ceasefire and risk a wider war, and that the major powers lacked the political will to reach a fair settlement.

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