Quicksand in the Western Sahara? From Referendum Stalemate to Negotiated Solution

Quicksand in the Western Sahara? From Referendum Stalemate to Negotiated Solution

Jacques Roussellier argues that the Western Sahara dispute has stalled because the UN’s referendum framework ignores the nation-building projects under way in Morocco, in Algeria and among the Sahrawis themselves. He traces the conflict from Spanish colonisation through the 1975 ICJ advisory opinion, the Green March and the Madrid Accords to the 1991 Settlement Plan and the deadlock over who could vote.

In his account the referendum became mainly a means of pressure that preserved the status quo while each side held its position. His evidence includes the disputed voter lists, the negotiations under James Baker, Morocco’s rejection of the 2003 peace plan and the competing interests of the United States, France, Spain and Russia. He treats Morocco’s insistence that its sovereignty is not negotiable as a major obstacle and argues that independence and integration or autonomy must all remain real options.

Roussellier concludes that a lasting settlement has to deal with clashing ideas of sovereignty and an emerging Sahrawi national identity. He calls for broad negotiations on several tracks that include civil society, backed by coordinated pressure from outside powers.

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